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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 6(b) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Current application of legal standards to the activities of participants in the securities industry reflects a blend of two distinct
regulatory techniques.' Through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2
('34 Act) the federal government imposes direct requirements and prohibitions upon the behavior of securities market participants.' These requirements and prohibitions define the parameters of lawful conduct
within the securities industry4 and, in some instances, provide that violations will result in the imposition of civil and criminal liabilities.' In addition to imposing direct regulation, however, the '34 Act regulates the
activities of securities market participants by supervising the selfregulation of market institutions.6 Through this indirect means of regula'See H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 at 3 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. Doc. No. 95]; 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1168-83 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as

Loss].
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78h(a) (1976) (§ 8 of '34 Act imposes limitations upon borrowing
of funds by brokers, dealers, or exchange members acting as such); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)
(§ 10(b) of '34 Act prohibits use of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with purchase or sale of security where device or contrivance is prohibited by
regulation); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976 & Supp. I 1977) (§ 13 of '34 Act requires issuers of
registered securities to file periodic reports with Securities and Exchange Commission); 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (§ 14(e) of '34 Act prohibits fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender offer). See also H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 1, at 3.
See ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS 83-120 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ROBBINS].
The primary objectives of the '34 Act are disclosure of information by registered issuers,
regulation of credit, and prevention of fraud and abuse in the securities industry. See id.;
note 3 supra.
' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) (§ 9(e) of '34 Act creates civil liability for any person who manipulates security prices); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976) (§ 16(b) of '34 Act imposes
civil liability upon insiders for profits derived from short-swing transactions in issuer's
securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(b) (1976 & Supp. I 1977) (§ 32 of '34 Act imposes criminal
liabilities upon persons who willfully violate provisions of '34 Act or rules or regulations
promulgated thereunder). See also Schwartz, Express and Implied Remedies Under the
FederalSecurities Laws, 9 INST. SEC. REG. 341 (1978); Matthews, Criminal Prosecutions
Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of
SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1971).
6 See H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 1,at 3-5; Jennings, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 663, 663-67 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jennings]. Major institutions of the
securities market are the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). See Loss, supra
note 1, at 1170. In 1944 twenty-five exchanges had registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but through attrition and mergers, the number of registered exchanges has steadily decreased. See id.
2

4
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tion, the federal government both permits and requires national
securities exchanges to adopt rules governing the business conduct of
their members.7
The federal government influences the character of stock exchange
rules through provisions of the '34 Act relating to the registration of
stock exchanges as national securities exchanges.8 Section 6(a) of the '34
Act provides that an exchange may be registered as a national securities
exchange by filing an application with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).' Section 5 of the '34 Act 0 provides impetus for registration
by prohibiting use of the facilities of an exchange for the purpose of effecting a transaction in a security unless the exchange is registered
under section 6.11 Section 6(b) describes the circumstances under which

See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976) ('34 Act, § 6). Section 6(a) of the '34 Act permits a stock exchange to be registered as a national stock exchange by filing with the SEC an application
conforming to SEC rules. Id. § 78f(a). Section 6(b) of the '34 Act provides that the SEC will
not register an exchange unless the exchange promulgates and enforces certain types of exchange rules. Id. § 78f(b)(3-8). For example, an exchange must promulgate rules designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster competition among persons engaged in effecting transactions in
securities, and to protect investors. See id. § 78f(b)(5). In addition, the SEC will not register
an exchange unless its rules provide for disciplinary sanctions, and the exchange has the
capacity to enforce member compliance with both exchange rules and the '34 Act. See id. §
78f(b)(1 & 6).
The '34 Act defines "exchange" as any organization, association, or group of persons
that constitutes, maintains or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together
purchasers and sellers of securities. Id. § 78c(a)(1). "Member", when used with respect to an
exchange, refers to any person who is permitted either to effect transactions on an exchange without the services of another person, or to make use of exchange facilities for effecting transactions thereon without payment of a commission or fee or with the payment of
a commission or fee that is less than the commission or fee charged the general public. See
id. § 78c(a)(3) ('34 Act, § 3(a)(3)).
See id. § 78f; note 7 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1976). Section 6(a) of the '34 Act confers authority upon the SEC to
prescribe by rule the information required to be included in the application of an exchange
for registration. Id. Section 6(a) requires that the application contain the rules of the exchange requesting registration. Id.; see note 7 supra.
10 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1976).
" Id. The '34 Act defines exchange "facility" as the premises of an exchange, its property, any right to use exchange premises or property or any service thereof for the purpose
of effecting or reporting a transaction on an exchange, including any system of communication to or from an exchange that is maintained by or with the consent of the exchange. Id. §
78c(a)(2). "Facility" also embraces any right of an exchange to the use of any property or service. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976) ('34 Act, § 19). Section 19 of the '34 Act outlines
responsibilities and oversight of national stock exchanges. See id. § 78s(b)-(i). Section 19 requires exchanges to comply and enforce compliance with the provisions of the '34 Act, rules
and regulations thereunder, and exchange rules. Id. § 78s(g). Section 19 also requires exchanges to file with the SEC preliminary notice of proposed rule changes and confers upon
the SEC power to amend or delete exchange rules upon publication of notice and opportunity
for hearing. Id. § 78s(b)&(c). Section 19 does not, however, confer authority upon the SEC to
enforce member compliance with exchange rules. See id. § 78s; Loss, supra note 1, at 1178.
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the SEC will deny registration of an exchange." Specifically, section 6(b)
provides that an exchange shall not be registered unless the rules of the
exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices," to promote just and equitable principles of trade, 4 and to protect investors.'5 While section 6 does not incorporate exchange rules or
give exchange rules the force of federal law," section 6 requires that exchanges promulgate certain types of rules as a precondition to participation in the securities industry. 7
Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in case law addressing the question whether there is an implied private right of action
under section 6 of the '34 Act. 8 Plaintiffs have brought actions in federal
courts against issuers, exchange members, and exchanges themselves on
the theory that conduct in violation of exchange rules is conduct in violaSee id. § 78f(b) (3-8) (1976); note 7 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1976).
14
Id.
15Id.
"I See id. § 78f; note 7 supra.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (3-8) (1976); text accompanying notes 13-15 supra; Note, The
Suitability Rule: Should a Private Right of Action Exist? 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493, 513
(1981) [hereinafter cited as The Suitability Rule]. In addition to providing for the registration of stock exchanges, the '34 Act also provides for the registration of organizations of
broker-dealers trading in the over-the-counter market (OTC market). See 15 U.S.C. § 78 0-3
(1976) ('34 Act, § 15A). The '34 Act, as amended in 1936, regulated the activities of participants in the OTC market by requiring broker-dealers to independently register under
the '34 Act. See id. § 78o (1976). Partly in response to the desires of OTC market representatives for some form of industry self-regulation, and partly in response to a perceived need
to cope with methods of doing business which, while technically legal, are nonetheless unfair
and damaging to the mechanism of the free and open market, Congress added § 15A to the
'34 Act. See id. § 78 o-3 (1976); H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 1, at 604-07; S. REP. No. 1455 at
3 and H.R. REP. No. 2307 at 4, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Section 15A provides that an
association of brokers and dealers may register as a national securities association by filing
an application with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78 0-3(a) (1976). Like § 6 of the '34 Act, § 15A(b)
describes circumstances under which the SEC shall not register an association of brokers
and dealers, many of which relate to the character of association rules. See id. § 78
0-3(b)(2-11) (1976); Jennings, supra note 6, at 675-76. The NASD is the only association that
has applied for registration under § 15A. See Loss, supra note 1, at 1365.
" See, e.g., State Teacher's Retirement Bd. v. Flour Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 851-53 (2d
Cir. 1981) (no implied private right of action for alleged violation of § A2 of NYSE Listing
Agreement and Company Manual requiring issuer to promptly notify public of large contract); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 678-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (no implied private
action for alleged violation of NYSE Rule 405 and Art. III, § 2 of NASD Rules of Fair Practice requiring broker to make inquiry into customer's financial condition before opening account); Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-86 (W.D.
Mo. 1981) (implying private action for alleged egregious violation of NYSE Rule 405); Coleman v. D.H. Blair & Co., Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,252,
91,643-49 (S.D.N.J. 1981) (no implied private right of action for alleged violations of NYSE
Rule 405 or NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. Ill, § 2 requiring broker inquiry into financial
condition of customer). See generally Thayer, Public Wrong andPrivateAction, 24 HARV L.
REV. 317 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Thayer].
12
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tion of federal law.19 Early decisions in actions brought under section 6
uniformly recognize that under appropriate circumstances, conduct in
violation of exchange rules gives rise to an implied right of action."0 Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have altered and refined the
process by which a court determines whether an implied right of action
exists under a federal statute.2 Consequently, a determination of
whether an implied right of action exists under section 6 involves a reappraisal of early section 6 precedent in light of redefined standards.'
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.23 and Buttrey v. MerrillLynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.24 are early Circuit Court decisions that
have heavily influenced litigation regarding the existence of an implied
private right of action under section 6.25 In Colonial Realty, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether a
court could imply a private right of action for alleged violations of New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD) rules requiring member firms to conduct their dealings in a manner consistent with just and equitable principles of trade."

" See Comment, Securities Regulation-Expanding the Scope of the 1934 Act-The
Issuer's Liability for Failure to Comply with the NYSE Company Manual, 29 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1251 [hereinafter cited as Issuer's Liability]; Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange
Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1120 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Member Liability]; Note, Exchange Liability Under Section 6 of the
Securities Exchange Act. The Eligible Plaintiff Problem, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 112 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Exchange Liability]. See generally Thayer, supra note 18.
' See text accompanying notes 24-51 infra.
21 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1978);
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); text accompanying notes 61-97 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 109-83 infra.
" 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
2' 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
' See Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-86
(W.D. Mo. 1981) (applying Buttrey to question whether implied private right of action under
§ 6 exists); Coleman v. D.H. Blair & Co., Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
CCH 98,252, 91,643 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Colonial Realty is starting point in § 6 implication
analysis). See generally The Suitability Rule, supra note 17.
' See 358 F.2d at 179-80. The plaintiff in Colonial Realty alleged violations of Article
XIV of the NYSE Constitution, Article I, § 2(a) of the NASD Bylaws, and Article III, § 1 of
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. See id. At the time plaintiff brought suit, Article XIV of
the NYSE Constitution provided that the NYSE could expel a member for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. See 358 F.2d at 180. Article XIV currently
provides that the NYSE Board of Directors shall have power to adopt disciplinary rules to
address violations of exchange rules or of the '34 Act. See NYSE CONST., Art. XIV, § 1,
reprinted in 2 N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE (CCH)
1653, at 1091-92 (1980). Article XIV
enumerates a range of disciplinary sanctions for exchange rule violations, including expulsion. See id. at 1029. Article I, § 2(a) of the NASD By-Laws prohibits the membership of any
broker or dealer who has been or is barred or suspended from any market organization for
conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. See NASD BY-LAWS, art. 1,
§ 2(a), reprinted in (1976) NASD SEC. DEALER'S MANUAL (CCH) 1102, 1045. Article III, § 1
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Plaintiff Colonial Realty Corp. (Colonial Realty) contended that Bache &
Company (Bache) violated NYSE and NASD rules when Bache sold
securities from Colonial Realty's margin account in response to a decline
in stock market prices.' Arguing that Bache had acted in violation of an
alleged oral agreement with respect to the minimum required margin,
Colonial Realty brought action under section 6 in conjunction with actions for breach of contract and common law negligence."
Observing that the question of whether courts should imply a
private right of action under section 6 is not susceptible to a simple, absolute answer,' the Second Circuit held that when a plaintiff seeks to
predicate civil liability upon violation of an exchange rule, a court must
look to the nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulation of
the securities market. 0 The court noted that some exchange rules might
properly be regarded as a substitute for direct SEC regulation,31 and
that the imposition of civil liability under such rules might be necessary
and appropriate to fulfilling the goals of the '34 Act." Because the plaintiff in ColonialRealty alleged violation of only those exchange rules that
require adherence to "just and equitable principles of trade,"33 however,
of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice requires members to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of their affairs. See
id. at 2014; note 17 supra.
' See 358 F.2d at 179. A margin account is an arrangement whereby a customer purchases stock from a brokerage firm by advancing only a portion of the purchase price with
the firm advancing credit for the balance due. See Stephens v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 413
F. Supp. 50, 50 (N.D. Ala. 1976). The brokerage firm maintains the purchased stock as collateral for the loan. See id. The defendant in ColonialRealty sold securities from plaintiff's
margin account in lieu of making a margin call. See 358 F.2d at 179. A margin call is a demand by a broker to increase the money or securities held as collateral in the event the
price of the stock has fallen since the date of purchase. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 871
(5th ed. 1979).
' See 358 F.2d at 179-80. The plaintiff in ColonialRealty alleged that Bache had orally
agreed that Bache would not require a margin in excess of the minimum requirements of
the NYSE. See id.; note 28 supra; text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
See 358 F.2d at 182.
o 358 F.2d at 182. The ColonialRealty court reasoned that because the exchanges enjoy wide discretion in promulgating rules as to matters not addressed by statute or regulation, Congress may not have intended that violation of any exchange rule would result in
civil liability. See id. at 181. Although acknowledging a duty to make effective the congressional purpose and policy of federal statutes, the court noted that exchange rules promulgated under § 6 vary greatly in their relationship to the '34 Act. See id.
I Under the Colonial Realty analysis, to the extent that an exchange rule is a
substitute for direct SEC regulation, the case for the implication of a private right of action
is stronger. The court reasoned that because the implication of a private right of action
under § 6 should not interfere with state law principles of fiduciary duty, a court should imply a right of action only when an exchange rule clearly reflects the influence of federal
reglation. See 358 F.2d at 182-83; note 31 supra.
I See id. The Colonial Realty court noted that the case for implying a private right of
action would be strongest when an exchange rule imposed a duty unknown at common law.
See note 32 supra; text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
' See note 26 supra.
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the Second Circuit refused to imply a private right of action under section 6 under the circumstances presented u Fearing that the standard's
vagueness would require fashioning a new body of federal brokercustomer law in place of principles of state law, 5 the court held that exchange rules requiring adherence to just and equitable principles of
trade were not so directly related to SEC regulation as to permit the implication of a private right of action. 6
In Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,37 the
Seventh Circuit followed an approach to determining whether an implied private right of action exists under section 6 that focuses upon the
conduct of the defendant rather than the nature of the rule alleged.'
Buttrey involved alleged violations of NYSE Rule 405.1' Rule 405 requires all members of the NYSE to use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to each customer, order, and account accepted or carried by a member." The plaintiff in Buttrey, a trustee in bankruptcy for
a dealer in securities,4 alleged that Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) violated Rule 405 by permitting the dealer to
open and actively trade in an account without making inquiries into the
financial condition of the dealer.42 As a result of failing to make such inquiries, the plaintiff contended that Merrill Lynch was liable under section 6 for losses the dealer sustained in speculations made with
fraudulently converted property of the bankrupt dealer's customers.43
On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit
relied on Colonial Realty for the proposition that stock exchange rules
can play an integral role in the regulation of the securities industry.44
Observing that the NYSE promulgated Rule 405 in accordance with sec3' 358 F.2d at 182-83.

See id. at 183. In 1961, Professor Loss remarked that implying a private right of action under § 6 of the '34 Act would result in a substantial infringement of state court
jurisdiction. See Loss, supra note 1, at 996-99. If a federal question arose upon every allegation of an exchange rule violation, federal courts effectively would have exclusive jurisdiction over customer-broker suits. See id.; text accompanying notes 68, 173-85 infra.
358 F.2d at 183.
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
See id. at 141-43; text accompanying notes 39-50 infra.
See 410 F.2d at 141.
NYSE RULE 405, reprinted in 2 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE (CCH) 2,405 (1980); see
The Suitability Rule, supra note 17, at 493-96.
, See 410 F.2d at 136.
42 See id. at 141. The plaintiff in Buttrey alleged that the defendant-broker authorized
the opening of plaintiffs account without receiving any financial statements, bank
references, or credit reports of plaintiff. See id. In addition, plaintiff alleged that the
defendant-broker did not ascertain whether plaintiff had filed certain required reports with
the SEC, or whether plaintiff traded as principal or agent. See id.
See id. at 137.
4, See id. at 142. The Buttrey court found that the defendant-broker's failure
to make
any inquiries into the financial condition of the plaintiff constituted breach of a duty that
plays an integral role in SEC regulation. See id. In finding that an implied right of action ex-
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tions 6 and 19 of the '34 Act,4 the court determined that implying a
private right of action under section 6 would be consistent with the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce rights and liabilities arising
under the '34 Act.46 While declining to hold that a private plaintiff may
bring action for a merely negligent violation of Rule 405,"7 the court held
that because Merrill Lynch's alleged Rule 405 violation involved conduct
tantamount to fraud, plaintiff had stated a cause of action under section
6.48 Reasoning that the touchstone for determining whether a court
should imply a private right of action for violation of an exchange rule is

ists under § 6 of the '34 Act, however, the Buttrey court also focused upon the degree to
which the alleged conduct approached fraud. See id. at 143; note 42 supra.
"s See 410 F.2d at 141; 15 U.S.C. § 78f, 78s (1976); notes 7, 11 supra.
" See 410 F.2d at 142; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) ('34 Act, § 27). Section 27 of the '34 Act
gives United States District Courts exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the '34 Act, and
over all suits in law and equity to enforce any liability or duty under the '34 Act or regulations thereunder. Id. The Buttrey court held that because exchange rules are promulgated
under sections 6 and 19 of the '34 Act, violations of exchange rules may be actionable as
violations of duties created by the '34 Act. See 410 F.2d at 142. Since § 27 grants jurisdiction
as to duties as well as rules, the court observed that violation of an exchange rule may be
actionable even if the exchange rule is not considered a rule under the '34 Act. See id.;
Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12,
18-19 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels]. The Supreme Court, however, has heavily
criticized reliance upon § 27 as evidence of congressional intent to create a private cause of
action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979). In Redington, the
Supreme Court held that § 27 creates no cause of action of its own force because it neither
creates rights nor imposes liabilities. Id. The Court held that a plaintiff seeking to bring an
implied cause of action must find his rights in the substantive provisions of the '34 Act
before invoking the jurisdictional provision. Id.
'7 See 410 F.2d at 142. The Buttrey court held that errors of judgment by a defendant
resulting in violation of an exchange rule might not support a federal cause of action. See id.
at 143; text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
" See 410 F.2d at 142. The Buttrey court did not specifically address the question of
why violations of exchange rules amounting to less than fraud might not support the implication of a federal cause of action. See id. at 141-43. The Buttrey court possibly might
have articulated the "tantamount to fraud" standard to reconcile the implied cause of action
under § 6 with the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act. See note 5 supra.Several courts have
followed the Buttrey court's holding that violation of an exchange rule becomes actionable
when the conduct alleged is tantamount to fraud. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris,
Upham & Co., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-86 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Roll v. Blyth Eastman Dillon
& Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1036-37 (S.D.N.J. 1977), affd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Shorrock v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,251, 92,678 (D. Or. 1977). Two courts, however, have
leveled serious criticisms at conditioning the availability of a private right of action under §
6 upon the degree to which the challenged conduct approaches the level of fraud. See
Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 418-19 (D. Minn. 1977); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co.,
[1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, 90,809 (N.D. Cal. 1976). According to the Nelson court, conditioning the availability of a private right of action upon the
type of conduct alleged leads to the legally illogical result that violations of the same rule do
not consistently give rise to the same right of action. See 428 F. Supp. at 418-19. The Zagari
court similarly reasoned that the existence of a private right of action under § 6 is a question wholly independent of the degree to which the alleged conduct approaches fraud. See
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the extent to which the purpose of the rule is to protect investors,49 the
Seventh Circuit held that implying a private right of action to redress an
egregious violation of Rule 405 would be consistent with the purposes of
the '34 Act.5 0
While ColonialRealty and Buttrey continue to influence litigation involving implied.private rights of action under section 6,"1 both decisions
expressly relied on the heavily criticised ruling in J. I.Case & Co. v.
Borak 2 In Borak, a shareholder of a recently merged corporation
brought action in federal court charging that proxy solicitation material
issued in connection with the merger was materially false and
misleading in violation of SEC rule 14a-9.5 a In overturning the trial
[1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,809; Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customerfor Violations of a Rule of a RegisteredStock Exchange, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 267 (1970); The Suitability Rule, supra note 17, at 505-07.
'" See 410 F.2d at 142; text accompanying notes 65, 109-34 infra.
' See 410 F.2d at 142; text accompanying notes 67, 154-68 infra.
"' See note 25 supra.
52 See 358 F.2d at 181; 410 F.2d at 142; J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In
Borak, the Supreme Court adopted an extremely liberal approach to implying private rights
of action under federal statutes. See 377 U.S. at 432; Maher, Implied PrivateRights of Action and the FederalSecurities Laws: A HistoricalPerspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
783, 793-96 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Maher]; Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L.
REV. 553, 553-59 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Comment, Implied Rights of Action in
FederalLegislation: Harmonization Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928,
929-932 [hereinafter cited as Statutory Scheme]; text accompanying notes 53-60 infra.
The Supreme Court first implied a private right of action under a federal statute in
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36-42 (1961). See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d
283, 298 (2d Cir. 1981), petitionfor writ of certiorarigranted, 2-23-82, 50 U.S.L.W. 3078 (No.
80-757); Note, Implying Civil Remedies Under FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 285, 285 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Implying Civil Remedies]. In Rigsby, the plaintiff
railway switchman was injured as a result of a defective handhold on a railcar. See id. at 36.
Plaintiff sought to predicate liability upon an alleged violation of § 4 of the Federal Safety
Appliance Act requiring secure handholds on the ends and sides of railcars moving in interstate commerce. See id. at 36-37; Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, § 4, 27 Stat. 531
(1893). Finding that § 4 was intended for the especial protection of railway employees such
as the plaintiff, the Supreme Court ruled on the basis of common law authorities that an implied cause of action for damages exists for disregard of the statutory command. See 241
U.S. at 39. See also Couch v. Steele, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1195 (Q.B. 1854)
(private action by plaintiff seaman for violation of statute requiring shipowners to store certain medicines aboard vessel); Anon., 6 Mod. 26, 26-27, 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791 (Q.B. 1794) (action by landlord for violation by tenant of statute prohibiting waste); 3 BLACK COM. 51,123
(Lewis ed. 1898); 1 COYMES DIGEST, Action Upon Statute, 445-53 (5th ed. 1824).
Several commentators trace the history of implied private rights of action to the tort
law principle that conduct in violation of statute is unreasonable and therefore negligent.
See Mowe, FederalStatutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 ORE. L. REV. 3, 4-8 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Mowel; Thayer, supra note 18, at 317-29; Maher, supra at 786. Under a
tort per se theory, a court accepts statutory duty as evidencing a duty owed the plaintiff.
See id. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
1 See 377 U.S. at 427-28; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981). The SEC promulgated SEC rule
14a-9 under the authority of § 14(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a) prohibits the solicitation of any proxy in contravention of such rules and regulations as the SEC
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court's determination that the jurisdictional provision of the '34 Act
restricts the types of relief a federal court may grant for violation of the
securities laws,54 the Supreme Court imposed a duty upon federal courts
to be alert in recognizing the rights of private plaintiffs in order to make
effective the congressional purpose and policy in federal statutes., The
Court observed that Congress's intent in enacting section 14(a) was to
ensure fair corporate suffrage for the stockholders of companies
registered under the '34 Act,56 and that the latitude Congress conferred
upon the SEC in implementing section 14(a) was evidence of the broad
remedial purpose of the statute. 7 Relying on these considerations as
well as the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce rights and
liabilities arising under the '34 Act,58 the Supreme Court ruled that
private enforcement of proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to
SEC enforcement. 9 The Court upheld the plaintiff's right to attack the
consummated merger by way of action under SEC Rule 14a-9 even
though neither section 14(a) nor rule 14a-9 expressly contemplates such
an action. 5
Indications that Borak would no longer continue to control the implication of private rights of action under federal statutes first became

may prescribe as necessary or appropriate or for the protection of investors. See id. SEC
Rule 14a-9 prohibits materially false or misleading statements or omissions in proxy solicitation materials. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981). See generally FLEISHER, TENDER OFFERS:
DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (1978).

" See 377 U.S. at 427-28; 317 F.2d 838, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1963). The trial court in Borak
ruled that § 27 of the '34 Act limited the court's capacity to grant declaratory relief. See id.
Because the merger of plaintiffs corporation was complete as of the time of suit, the trial
court concluded that it lacked power to redress the alleged violation of SEC Rule 14a-9. See
id.; note 53 supra.
See 377 U.S. at 432; Maher, supra note 52, at 793-96.
See 377 U.S. at 431; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1383]; SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as SEN. REP. No. 792].
17 See 377 U.S. at 431-32; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); note 53 supra.
See 377 U.S. at 432-32; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) ('34 Act, § 27); note 46 supra.
s See 377 U.S. at 431. In finding an implied private right of action under SEC Rule
14a-9, the Borak court pointed to the expressly conferred treble damage action under the
antitrust laws. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (Clayton Act, § 4). Section 4 of the Clayton Act
provides that anyone who is injured in his business or property by reason of actions forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue in federal district court and recover three-fold the
damages he sustained plus the cost of suit. Id.; see Frankel, supra note 52, at 555-57.
, See 377 U.S. at 432; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981); note 53
supra.See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 156-57 (1972) (private
right of action implied under SEC Rule 10b-5 for injury caused by misrepresentation of
material fact); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1971)
(right of action implied under SEC Rule 10b-5 for plan to purchase securities with ultimately
worthless assets); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 193-200 (1967) (implied right of action to recover costs of removing vessels negligently sunk in violation of §
15 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); Statutory Scheme, supra note 52, at 929-32.
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apparent in Cort v. Ash. 1 In Cort, a stockholder brought suit in federal
court seeking to compel corporate directors to account for political contributions to federal candidates made in violation of a criminal statute. 2
In denying the existence of an implied private right of action to recover
the money illegally contributed,63 the Supreme Court established four
factors relevant in determining whether a court should imply a private
right of action under a federal statute.6' First, a court must inquire
whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted. Second, a court must determine whether any
explicit or implicit legislative intent exists either to create or deny a
private remedy.6 6 Third, the implication of a private right of action must
be consistent with the underlying purposes of the relevant legislation.
Finally, implying a private right of action should not unnecessarily in6 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
12 See id. at 68-72; 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed in Pub. L. 94-283, title II, § 201(a)
(1976) (Federal Elections Campaign Act). Section 610 of the Federal Elections Campaign Act
forbade national banks, corporations, and labor organizations from making political campaign contributions or expenditures. See id.
See 422 U.S. at 77-82.
See id. at 78; notes 65-72 infra.
65 See 422 U.S. at 78. Inquiry into whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted primarily involves a determination regarding whether the plaintiff has standing to bring action under the relevant statute. See 422
U.S. at 80-84; Maher, supra note 52, at 797-98. The Supreme Court recently has handed
down two decisions that focus upon the standing of a plaintiff to bring action under the
federal securities laws. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 34-36 (1977)
(defeated tender offeror cannot bring implied cause of action for violation of statute prohibiting fraudulent statements in tender offer documents since statutory purpose is to protect investors); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-49 (1975) (to bring
action under SEC rule 10b-5, plaintiff must be either purchaser or seller of security with
respect to which alleged fraud was committed); text accompanying notes 109-34 infra.
" See 422 U.S. at 78. Indications of congressional intent to imply a cause of action
under a particular federal statute have become the central inquiry in post-Cort Supreme
Court decisions on implying private rights of action under federal statutes. See text accompanying notes 136-53 infra. Overriding concern for discerning congressional intent in questions of implication may be the product of the Supreme Court's growing recognition of the
separation of powers doctrine. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-78
(1979) (ultimate question in implication analysis is whether Congress intended to create
private right of action and not whether court can improve statutory scheme); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); (Cort approach to
questions of implication invites constitutionally forbidden judicial legislation). In a strict
separation of powers context, federal courts lack power to imply a private right of action
unless traditional principles of statutory construction clearly indicate that Congress intended
to confer a private right of action under the relevant federal statute. See Frankel, supra
note 52, at 557-59.
6 See 422 U.S. at 78. Consistency with statutory purposes is the predominant rationale of the now disaffirmed Borak decision. See 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); text accompanying notes 52-66 supra and 68-97 infra. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has criticized
reliance upon statutory purpose as a basis for implying a private right of action under
federal statutes. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 29 (1979)
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terfere with areas traditionally within state court jurisdiction. 8 Since
the first three factors originated in earlier federal court decisions on implying private rights of action under federal statutes, 9 the Cort opinion
did not represent a radically new or different approach to the implication issue."0 Insofar as it decreases the significance of whether implying
a cause of action would help make effective the purpose and policy of
federal statutes," however, Cort represented a retreat from the more
liberal judicial philosophy of Borak 2
Further complicating the issue of whether an implied private right
of action is available under section 6 are a series of cases decided after
Cort that cast doubt not only on the continued validity of the Cort
analysis, 7 but also on the issue whether federal courts even have the
power to imply private rights of action under federal statutes." In
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,75 the Supreme Court considered
whether an implied right of action exists under section 17(a) of the '34
Act. 6 Instead of independently examining the Cort factors in an attempt
(statutory purpose inquiry subordinate to congressional intent inquiry); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (disavowing Borak as controlling precedent in questions whether to imply private right of action under federal statute); notes 154-68 infra.
" See 422 U.S. at 78; notes 175-83 infra.
19See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975)
(consideration of relationship between private action and statutory purpose); National R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461 (1974) (consideration
of legislative history in question whether to imply private right of action); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1967) (consideration whether statute
designed to protect certain plaintiffs or interests); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33, 37 (1916) (consideration whether plaintiff is member of statutorily protected class).
o See Frankel, supra note 52, at 559; note 69 supra.
' See Statutory Scheme, supra note 52, at 932-35; text accompanying notes 65-68
supra.
7 See Maher, supra note 52, at 783-85; text accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
" See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,

__

U.S.

__

,

101 S.Ct. 1571-84 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11-36
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560-83 (1979); text accompanying notes
75-97 infra.
" See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (implication of private right of action in absence of clear congressional intent to create
private right is beyond power of federal courts); Frankel, supra note 52, at 563-70 (recent
Supreme Court decisions rest on principle that federal courts lack power to grant judicially
implied relief for statutory violations).
" 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
"' See id. at 568-79; 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976). Section 17(a) of the '34 Act requires
securities brokerage firms to furnish copies of such reports as the SEC may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest. Id. The plaintiff in Redington alleged that
the defendant auditing firm breached duties owing under § 17(a) through defendant's failure
to discover the true financial condition of Weis Securities Inc. (Weis), an insolvent securities
brokerage firm. See 442 U.S. at 563-66. The plaintiff sought to predicate liability of Touche
Ross & Co. on the theory that had financial audits been properly prepared, the precarious
financial condition of Weis would have been discovered in time to take remedial action to
prevent liquidation and loss to Weis' customers. See id. at 565-66.
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to determine whether the Court should imply a private right of action
under section 17(a), 7 the Supreme Court characterized the matter as one
7
of determining congressional intent through statutory construction. 1
While the Court discussed three of the four Cort factors in analyzing
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action under section 17(a),18 the Redington Court expressly limited the significance of
those factors to the congressional intent determination." Relying on the
language of section 17(a),8' its legislative history," and the presence of
express private rights of action in other provisions of the '34 Act, 3 the
Court found that there was no evidence of congressional intent to imply
a private right of action under section 17(a) 4 Specifically disavowing
Borak as controlling precedent, 5 the Supreme Court held that a court
must construe the statute under which a private right 'of action is
asserted rather than attempt to improve upon it. 8
In TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis," the Supreme
Court further elaborated on the congressional intent approach to implying private rights of action and its relationship to the Cort analysis. 8 In
1

See notes 78-86 infra.

See 442 U.S. at 568. A statutory construction approach to implying private rights of
action under federal statutes is consistent with the principle that federal courts lack power
to judicially recognize private actions under federal statutes in the absence of clear
legislative intent. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1978) (Powell,
J., dissenting); Maher, supra note 52, at 787-93. There is disagreement, however, as to
whether federal courts in fact lack power to recognize implied private rights of action. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.4
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (implying remedy refers to process by which court exercises
choice among judicial remedies according to reasons of policy embodied in particular
statute); Frankel, supra note 52, at 563-85.
71 See 442 U.S. at 575-76. In determining whether Congress intended to create
a
private right of action under § 17(a) of the '34 Act, the Redington Court discussed the
language and focus of § 17(a), its legislative history, and its statutory purpose. See id.
See id. at 575-76.
8 See id. at 568-71; note 76 supra.
82 See 442 U.S. at 571; note 67 supra.
See 442 U.S. at 571-74. While in Borak the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that because the '34 Act provides for express private remedies, implied relief was not
available, the Supreme Court in Redington took the opposite position. See 377 U.S. at
431-33; 442 U.S. at 571-74. Reasoning that when Congress wished to provide a remedy, Congress provided remedies expressly, the Court in Redington concluded that the implication
of a private right of action under § 17(a) might unacceptably broaden the remedies that Congress chose to provide for '34 Act violations. See 442 U.S. at 574. But see Leist v. Simplot,
638 F.2d 283, 298 (2d Cir. 1980), petitionfor writ of cert. granted,101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981) (No.
80-757) (observing that in view of history of implied rights of action, congressional silence on
remedies may reflect assumption that courts will provide remedies).
See 442 U.S. at 576.
See id. at 576-77.
See id. at 578.
8, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).

See 444 U.S. at 15-25; Underwood, TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis:
An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Definitionof an Implied Right of Action, 7 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 533, 544-48 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Underwood.
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finding that no implied private right of action exists under section 206 of
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,9 the TransamericaCourt expressly
minimized the importance of whether the statute's design is to protect a
particular class of persons and whether implying a cause of action would
be consistent with the statute's purpose." The Court relied on
Redington for the principle that in determining the existence of an implied right of action, the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to
create a remedy for private plaintiffs injured by conduct in violation of
the relevant statute." On examination of the language and legislative
history of section 206,92 the TransamericaCourt found that Congress did
not intend to create a private right of action. Accordingly, the Court
denied the existence of a private right without inquiry into considerations of statutory purpose or whether the claim was one traditionally
brought under state law.94 Observing that each of the securities laws
preceding the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 contain express private
remedies, 5 the Supreme Court remarked that Congress obviously knew
how to provide for private remedies, and that when Congress wished to
do so, it provided for private remedies expressly.
Supreme Court decisions after Transamerica have uniformly
acknowledged that congressional intent is the ultimate consideration in
determining whether to imply a private right of action under a federal
statute. While the most recent opinions indicate clearly that Cort con" See 444 U.S. at 15-25; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) (Investment Advisors Act of 1940, §
206). Section 206 of the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 ('40 Act) proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisors. See id. The plaintiff in Transamericaalleged that the defendants violated the '40 Act by failing to register under the Act, by misappropriating profitable
investment opportunities, and by causing plaintiff to purchase poor quality securities. See
444 U.S. at 13.
See id. at 15, 24; text accompanying notes 65 & 67 supra.
91 See 444 U.S. at 15-17; notes 75-85 supra.
92 See 444 U.S. at 16-22.

,3 See id. at 24.
" See id. The Transamerica Court held that because congressional intent is the
ultimate consideration in deciding whether to imply a private right of action under a specific
statute, when neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history indicate any intent to create an implied action, a court need not examine the remaining Cort factors. See
id. The dissent in Transamericaargued that upon application of all four Cort factors, a court
could only conclude that a private right of action does exist under the relevant statute
despite the absence of express statutory authorization. See id. at 25-26 (White, J., dissenting). The majority's refusal to consider whether implying a private right of action would be
consistent with statutory purposes is consistent with a strict statutory construction approach to implying private rights of action. See Underwood, supra note 88, at 545-46; text
accompanying note 72 supra.
, See 444 U.S. at 20-21.
See id.; note 83 supra.
" See California v. Sierra Club, __
U.S.
, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1779 (1981)
(ultimate issue in questions of implication is whether Congress intended to create a private
right of action); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, __
U.S. _
,
101 S. Ct. 1571, 1580 (1981) (implication of private right of action is matter of statutory con-
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tinues to be relevant at least insofar as aiding in the task of determining
congressional intent,98 recent opinions also indicate persistent disagreement regarding the proper weight of the four-factor analysis in determining the existence of implied private rights of action. 9 Whether recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing congressional intent operate
only to increase the weight of congressional intent in the four-factor
analysis' 0 or whether those decisions indicate that Cort is now completely
subsumed into the congressional intent analysis,' pre-Cort section 6
precedent clearly requires reevaluation. 2 Because the Cort, Redington,
and Transamericadecisions have substantially altered and redefined the
process by which a court may imply a private right of action under a
federal statute, 3 determining the existence of an implied right of action
under section 6 involves application of the Cort analysis as refined by
subsequent cases.'
Outside the confines of a particular case, one cannot determine
whether a plaintiff is a member of a class for whose especial benefit section 6 was enacted. As a result, inquiry into the first Cort factor is confined to determining whether Congress enacted section 6 for the
especial benefit of a particular class of persons.' 5 As Cort suggested,'

struction in which congressional intent is ultimate issue); Universities Research Ass'n v.
Coutou, __
U.S.
, 101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461 (1981) (question whether statute creates
private right of action is one of congressional intent and not whether court can improve on
statute).
98 See California v. Sierra Club, __
U.S. __
, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1778 (1981) (Cort
outlines proper approach to determining whether to imply private right); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, __
U.S.
, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1580 (1981)
(all Cort factors relevant to question whether Congress intended implied private right);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutou, __
U.S. __,
101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461 (1981) (first
three Cort factors relevant to inquiry into congressional intent).
" See California v. Sierra Club, __
U.S.
..
101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981). In Sierra
Club, the Supreme Court described Cort as the "preferred approach for determining
whether a cause of action should be implied from a federal statute." See id. at 1778. While
the Court recognized that recent cases indicate congressional intent to be the ultimate inquiry, the Court followed the four-factor Cort approach in examining congressional intent.
See id. at 1779-81.
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell and Justice Stewart joined in a
concurring opinion that criticized the majority's emphasis on Cort. See id. at 1783 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Remarking that the Cort factors are merely guides in the central task
of determining legislative intent, the concurring opinion stated that in deciding an implied
right of action case, a court need not trudge through all four Cort factors. See id. 1783-84.
'" See California v. Sierra Club, __
U.S. __, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1778 (1981); note 99
supra.
,0, See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979); note 94
supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 109-83 infra.
'' See text accompanying notes 61-99 supra.
...
See text accompanying notes 109-83 infra.
"05See 422 U.S. at 78; text accompanying note 65 supra.
..
6 See 422 U.S. at 78. The Cort opinion characterized the first factor in the implication
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and as Redington and Transamerica have made clear," ' a court determines whether Congress intended a statute to confer especial benefits
upon a particular class of persons by examining statutory purpose as
10 8
well as the creation of specific rights or privileges in specific persons.
In terms of statutory purpose to protect or benefit a particular class
of persons, section 6 appears to be amenable to the implication of a
private right of action. 09 In the Senate and House reports accompanying
the '34 Act,"'° Congress made clear its concern for the investing public."'
With the stock market crash of 1929 fresh in its memory,"' Congress
enacted section 6 as part of an attempt to change the practices of stock
exchanges so that the investing public might justifiably place its confidence in those exchanges."' Finding that the liquidity of securities
made possible by exchange trading is potentially dangerous to the
stability of the national economy by facilitating the rapid sale of
securities in a panic market,"' Congress concluded that the extension of
analysis as whether the relevant statute was enacted for the especial benefit of any particular class of persons. See id. Cort goes on, however, to restate this inquiry in terms of
whether the relevant statute confers any specific rights upon the plaintiff. See id.
"7 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (first Cort
factor concerned with language and focus of statute); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (same).
See notes 106, 107 supra.

"7

See text accompanying notes 110-20 infra.
See generally SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56;
text accompanying notes 111-16 infra.
"' See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56 at 4; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 5. In
the Senate report accompanying the '34 Act, the Committee on Banking and Currency
remarked that the attitude of exchange authorities toward public regulation was sharply at
variance with the extent to which the public welfare must be guarded in exchange matters.
See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56, at 4. The Committee pointed to exchange support of
price manipulation as an example of the need to impose regulation for the protection of investors. See id. The House Report accompanying the '34 Act referred to the need to extend
a fiduciary duty from professional securities market participants to the ordinary citizen.
See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 5. Noting that the growth of public security
ownership had precipitated no changes in the management of stock exchange machinery,
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reasoned that the imposition of new
legal and ethical standards upon stock exchanges was necessary to protect the nonprofessional investor. See id. at 4-5.
"' See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 3.
The House report accompanying the '34 Act was careful to disavow any intent to wreak
vengeance upon stock exchanges for the economic catastrophe following the 1929 crash. See
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 53, at 3. Attributing the violent economic events of the
depression era to natural fluctuations in the economic system, the Report preceded from the
assumption that inadequate exchange regulation simply accentuated moderate fluctuations
into speculative booms and depressions. See id. The Senate Report accompanying the '34
Act, however, more directly attributed the economic dislocations of the depression to inadequate stock exchange regulation. See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 5, at 3-4.
"7

"'.

",

See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 4-5.

See id. The liquidity of securities made possible by exchange trading is potentially
dangerous to the stability of the national economy because of the ease with which securities
"

1062

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 39:1047

a fiduciary relationship between exchanges and the public was
necessary to the stability of the securities industry."5 As the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce indicated, when everything can be
sold at once, the public must have confidence not to sell. 16
Courts that have considered the section 6 implication issue in terms
of whether section 6 is intended for the protection of any specific persons also have concluded that Congress enacted section 6 for the protection of investors." 7 In two 1977 decisions involving section 6,118 the Second Circuit held that an implied cause of action does not exist in favor of
member firms of exchanges or their controlling persons because public
investors are the intended beneficiaries of the statute."9 District courts
similarly have concluded that exchange rules promulgated under section
6 relate directly to the protection of investors. 2 '

may be sold in a panic situation. See id. The House Report accompanying the '34 Act reasoned
that as an economic system grows more complicated and liquid, it must also become more
moderate, honest, and justifiably self-trusting. See id.
111See id.; H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 1, at 237-40; note 11 supra.
, See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 5.
See text accompanying notes 118-20 infra.
.. See Hirsch v. DuPont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Lank v. New York Stock Exch.,
548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977); note 119 infra.
...See 553 F.2d at 760-61; 548 F.2d at 65-66. In Hirsch, former partners of a NYSE
brokerage firm brought action under § 6 against the NYSE for alleged failure to disclose
certain information relating to the financial condition of a second brokerage firm with which
Hirsch proposed to merge. See 553 F.2d at 753. While seeking to predicate liability upon
SEC rule 10b-5, the plaintiff in Hirsch attempted to rely on NYSE rules to establish a duty
to disclose. See id. at 760; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Reasoning that the duty of a stock exchange to enforce exchange rules is a duty owed to public investors who are unable to fend
for themselves, the Second Circuit held that the NYSE was under no duty to notify the
partners of one of its members of the financial difficulties of another member. See 553 F.2d
at 760-62.
In Lank, a receiver in bankruptcy of a defunct brokerage firm brought action against
the NYSE under § 6 for alleged failures to enforce compliance with exchange rules. See 548
F.2d at 62-63. Plaintiff contended that had the NYSE enforced the bankrupt's compliance
with exchange rules through the sanction of suspension of membership, the losses suffered
by the bankrupt's customers, creditors, and stockholders might have been avoided. See id.
at 63. Finding that Congress intended to draw a clear distinction between public investors
and exchange members with respect to rights and liabilities arising under § 6, the Lank
court held that Congress did not intend to afford protection to exchange members in undertaking to regulate their conduct. See id. at 66. Accordingly, the court held that the NYSE
was not liable to a member organization for failure to enforce member compliance with exchange rules. See id.; But see New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1316
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (general and limited partners of member firm are within § 6 protected class);
Verace v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,735,90,575-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (subordinated lenders of member firm have standing to bring
§ 6 claim); Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., 403 F. Supp. 1020, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(same).
.. See Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-85
(W.D. Mo. 1981); Carr v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
95,563, 99,808-09 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Steinberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
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Analysis of the first Cort factor in terms of whether section 6 prohibits conduct or creates federal rights, however, leads to the opposite
conclusion. 21 Section 6 does not prohibit any particular type of
conduct.'" Section 5 prohibits use of the facilities of interstate commerce
to effect a transaction on an exchange that is not registered under sec24
tion 6.'1 Section 6, however, describes only the process of registration.1
Section 6 preconditions registration of an exchange upon the promulgation and enforcement of exchange rules,'" but does not undertake to
define those rules beyond requiring that they meet certain general standards. 26 Instead of prohibiting conduct in violation of exchange rules, section 6 indirectly regulates that conduct by requiring exchanges to promulgate and enforce exchange rules as a precondition to participation in
the securities market."
In Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 2 the Ninth Circuit recently considered whether section 6 protects investors in terms of whether section
6 prohibits conduct or creates federal rights in favor of certain
persons.'" The plaintiff in Jablon alleged not only that the defendant
violated exchange rules by failing to make investment recommendations
suitable to plaintiffs investment goals,"2 ' but also that the defendant
acted fraudulently in managing plaintiffs account.' Despite the alleged
fraud, the court held that no implied private right of action exists under
section 6.122 Because the statute creates neither rights nor liabilities on

& Smith, Inc. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,599, 96,121 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See generally Exchange Liability, supra note 19.
" See text accompanying notes 122-34 infra.
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); note 7 supra.
, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1976).
'z,See U.S.C. § 78f (1976); note 7 supra.
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1-8) (1976). Section 6(b) of the '34 Act provides that the SEC
shall not register an exchange as a national securities exchange unless the SEC determines
that both the exchange and the exchange's rules meet certain criteria. See id. The criteria
specified in § 6(b) relate to organization and capacity of the exchange, membership standards, representation of members in administration of the exchange, equitable allocation of
fees and dues, character of exchange rules, discipline for violation of exchange rules, and effect of exchange rules on competition. See id.; Jennings, supra note 6, at 670; note 7 supra.
'' See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (3-8); note 7 supra.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b); H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 1, at 3-5; The SuitabilityRule,
supra note 17, at 513; note 7 supra.
614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
12 See id. at 679-81.
See id. at 678-79.
,' See id.; text accompanying note 48 supra.
122 614 F.2d at 680. The Jablon court based its denial of an implied private right of action under § 6 on the interrelated grounds that § 6(b) creates no federal rights in favor of
certain persons, and that Congress did not intend to create an implied private right of action under § 6. See id. at 680-81; Comment, SecuritiesRegulation-PrivateRight of Action
Under Stock Exchange Rules-Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980),
1981 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 337, 337-52 [hereinafter cited as Private Right].
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the part of private persons, the Jablon court rejected the argument that
section 6's concern for the protection of investors warranted the implication of a private right of action. 33 In terms of the creation of specific
rights or privileges, Congress did not enact section 6 for the especial
benefit of a particular class of persons. 34
Analysis of the second factor in the Cort approach also indicates that
a court may not properly imply a private right of action under section
6.111 Evidence of explicit or implicit congressional intent, the ultimate
consideration in determining whether to imply a private right of action
under a federal statute,'3 6 is completely absent from the legislative
history of section 6."1 The role of stock exchanges in the administration
of the '34 Act reflects a compromise between direct government regulation of the securities industry and unfettered self-regulation of the industry by stock exchanges themselves.'38 Recognizing that rigid
statutory control would involve regulatory inflexibility as well as an
enormous expenditure of public funds,'39 Congress enacted the '34 Act to
reform exchange practices so that exchanges could carry the burden of
regulating the conduct of their members. 4' While the government retains control over the character of exchange rules,' the legislative
history of section 6 anticipates only exchange enforcement of exchange
enrules.' Nowhere did Congress suggest that private parties might
43
force exchange rules through federal law actions for damages.
See
,4 See
13 See
13 See
"3

id. at 680; Private Right, supra note 132, at 337-52.
614 F.2d at 680; text accompanying notes 121-33 supra.
422 U.S. at 78; text accompanying notes 75-97 supra.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, __

U.S.

__

, 101

S. Ct. 1571, 1580 (1981); text accompanying note 97 supra.
' See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 680-81 (1980); Coleman v. D.H. Blair
& Co., Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,252, 91,647 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); SEN.
REP. No. 792, supra note 56, at 1-6; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 1-16; text accompanying notes 138-43 infra.
"3 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at 14-16. In the Report accompanying the
Securities Exchange Bill of 1934, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
pointed out that the bill left a wide measure of responsibility and control in the exchanges
themselves. See id. at 15. The Committee noted that the Securities Exchange Bill left the
exchanges with the power to alter or amend exchange rules to meet unforeseen problems,
or to meet old problems more effectively. See id. In describing the purpose of leaving such
latitude to the exchanges, the committee expressed its hope that the effect of the bill would
be to give well-managed exchanges the power necessary to effect needed reforms
themselves without direct government intervention. See id.; Jennings, supra note 6, at
663-74; The Suitability Rule, supra note 17, at 496-99; text accompanying notes 6-17 supra.
' See SEN. REP. No. 1455, supra note 17, at 3-4; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 17, at
4-5.
1' See DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
...
See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976) ('34 Act, § 19); note 11 supra.
"' See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56, at 1-6; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at
1-16; H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 1, at 3.
' See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56, at 1-6; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 56, at
1-16; H.R. DOC. No. 95, supra note 1, at 3. Under the provisions of the '34 Act, the SEC is
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In Coleman v. D.H. Blair & Co.,'" the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York recently examined the question of
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action under section 6.145 The plaintiff-customer in Coleman charged the defendantbroker with fraud, willful misrepresentations, and failure to exercise
adequate supervision and control over plaintiffs account."' In holding
that the plaintiff could not predicate liability for these actions upon
alleged violations of NYSE and NASD rules,"7 the court found several
indications that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under section 6.14" The statutory bases for NYSE and NASD rules do
not confer rights or proscribe conduct by exchange or association
members."' Additionally, the court found that there is no mention of an
implied private right of action in the legislative history of section 61"' and
powerless to compel a member to comply with exchange rules. See Jennings, supra note 6,
at 671-72; Loss, supra note 1, at 1176-78. The SEC may, however, suspend or revoke the
registration of the exchange itself, or take administrative action against an exchange officer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (a)(1)&(3) (1976) ('34 Act, § 19); Loss, supra note 1, at 1178; note 11
supra.
'" [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,252 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See id. at 91,642-49.
.8 See id. at 91,642.
"7See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,642. The plaintiff in
Coleman alleged violations of NYSE Rules 405, 342(b) and 408 as well as violations of Article
III of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, sections 1, 2, 18, and 27. See id. NYSE Rule 405 and
§ 2, Article IlI of the NASD Rules impose an obligation upon member-firms to recommend
investment transactions that are suitable to the investment needs of a customer. See NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, reprintedin 1976 NASD SEC. DEALERS MANUAL (CCH)
2152; text accompanying note 42 supra.Section 1 of the NASD Rules obligates a member to
observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the
conduct of business. See (1976) NASD SEC. DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) 2151. Section 18 of
the NASD Rules prohibits fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive conduct in securities
transactions. See id. at 2168. Section 27 of the NASD Rules imposes upon members a
broad range of responsibilities and duties with respect to handling and review of accounts.
See id. at 2177. NYSE Rule 408 establishes minimum standards of conduct with respect to
the authorization and handling of discretionary trading accounts. See NYSE Rule 408,
reprintedin 2 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE (CCH) 2,405 (1980). NYSE Rule 342(d) requires the
general partners or directors of each member organization to establish and maintain a
system of supervision and control over departments, officers, and employees. See id. at
2342.
The holding in ColonialRealty may have influenced the Coleman plaintiff's decision to
allege violation of such a wide variety of NYSE and NASD Rules. Because Colonial Realty
conditions the availability of an implied private right of action upon the extent to which the
relevant exchange rule is a substitute for direct SEC regulation, pleading violation of
several rules increases one's chances of recovery. See 358 F.2d at 181; notes 31, 32 supra;
see generally Lowenfels, supra note 46.
"4 See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) at 91,647; text accompanying
notes 149-52 infra.
.. See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) at 91,647; text accompanying
notes 121-34 supra.
"5See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,647; text accompanying
notes 135-43 supra.
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that the existence of express private remedies in the '34 Act suggests
that the failure to provide an implied remedy in connection with exchange rules was not an oversight.'5 ' Finally, the court noted that the '34
Act's concept of supervised self-regulation suggests that Congress
elected self-regulation as the exclusive means of enforcement. 52' Relying
on these four indications, the Coleman court found that Congress did not
intend to create a private right of action under section 6, and accordingly, the court dismissed plaintiffs claim under section 6.153
The third Cort factor, whether the implication of a private right of
action would be consistent with the purposes of the '34 Act,' lends only
ambiguous support to implying a private right of action under section
6."' In two pre-Cort decisions,'56 the Second and Seventh Circuits expressly supported the implication of a private right of action under section 6 on the theory that potential civil liability for violation of exchange
rules would aid in realizing the '34 Act's purpose of protecting investors
by guaranteeing fairness in stock exchange transactions.'51 In addition,
because the '34 Act as a whole is directed primarily at eliminating fraud
in securities transactions,' 5' several courts have held that implying a
cause of action only when a defendant's conduct is tantamount to fraud is
a technique by which to prevent conflict between the implied remedy
under section 6 and the express remedies in other sections of the '34
59
Act.'
151 See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,647; text accompanying
note 83 supra.
"5See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,647; H.R. Doc. No. 95,

supra note 1, at 3-5.
"3 See [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,648.
" See 422 U.S. at 78; text accompanying note 67 supra.
"3 See text accompanying notes 156-68 infra.
15 See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1380-82 (2d Cir. 1975); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir. 1969); text accompanying
notes 61-72 supra.
", See 520 F.2d at 1381-82; 410 F.2d at 142; text accompanying note 55 supra. In Boeing, plaintiff brought suit claiming that the defendant issuer had failed to give adequate
notice of the impending redemption of convertible debentures. See 520 F.2d at 1374. Plaintiff predicated its suit on NYSE Listing Agreement provisions that required publication of
notice of intent to redeem debentures in certain approved publications. See id. at 1376-77.
The Second Circuit in Boeing, following its decision in ColonialRealty, held that considering the specific notice requirements of the Listing Agreement and their important role in
the statutory scheme, allegations of violations of the Listing Agreement gave rise to a colorable claim under federal law. See id. at 1380-86; text accompanying notes 26-36 supra.
"3 See note 4 supra.
,3 See Smith v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1385
(W.D. Mo. 1981); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,021, 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977).
...See id. at 168. In Utah State University,a state university opened several accounts
with numerous brokerage firms and purchased several millions of dollars of securities. See
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In Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science v.
Bear, Stearnes & Co.,16 however, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that implying a private cause of action under section 6 might
frustrate the purposes of the '34 Act.161 In Utah State University, a state
university brought action against its investment program broker for
violations of stock exchange and dealer association rules requiring the
broker to observe just and equitable principles of trade and to make investment recommendations suitable to the customer's investment objectives. 62' The Utah State University court, following the rule articulated
6
in Buttrey,"
' held that the complaint did not state a cause of action
under section 6 because the plaintiff did not allege overreaching,
misrepresentation, manipulation or deception. 64 Reasoning that Congress had chosen a system of self-regulation to avoid the disadvantages
of rigid direct regulation,' 61 the court voiced concern that potential civil
liability for violations of exchange rules might undercut flexibility in the
management of the NYSE and NASD. 6 Because exchanges might
hesitate to promulgate new rules if negligent violation of those rules
would create liability for exchange members,'6 7 the court refused to imply
a cause of action under section 6 to redress the conduct alleged.6
Even if, notwithstanding the concerns of the Utah State University
court, one concludes that implying a cause of action does support the
purposes of section 6,169 recent Supreme Court decisions expressly
minimizing the weight of the third Cort factor indicate that consistency
with legislative purpose alone will not support the implication of a
private right of action.' The statutory construction approach to implying private rights of action focuses not on policy considerations,' but on
the narrow issue of whether Congress actually intended to create an implied right of action under a given federal statute. 72 As other considera-

id. at 166. Following an audit of the university's investment program, the assistant attorney
general of Utah expressed his opinion that the university's investment program was illegal.
See id. The Supreme Court of Utah subsequently ruled that the university did not have
power with which to purchase securities with public funds, whereupon the university
brought suit against its brokers. See id.; First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Utah State
University, 544 P.2d 887 (S. Ct. Utah 1975).
" See 410 F.2d at 143; text accompanying notes 37-50 supra.
16

See 549 F.2d at 169.

See id. at 168; SEN. REP. No. 1455, supra note 17, at 3-4; H.R.
note 17, at 4-5.
See 549 F.2d at 168.
"

"'

REP.

No. 2307, supra

See id.

See id. at 168-69.
164 See text accompanying notes 154-59 supra.
'7 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); text accompanying notes 75-97 supra.
"I See Frankel, supra note 52, at 559-70.
172 See id.; text accompanying notes 75-97 supra.
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tions have been subsumed into the congressional intent inquiry, consistency with statutory purpose has become a less significant factor in
questions of implication.' 4
Analysis of the fourth Cort factor, whether implying a cause of action would unnecessarily interfere with areas traditionally within state
court jurisdiction' 5 also indicates that a court may not properly imply a
private right of action under section 6.17' The legal parameters of brokercustomer relationships traditionally have focused upon common law
principles of contract and fiduciary duty."' The Colonial Realty court,
eleven years before the Supreme Court's decision in Cort' 8 expressed
concern that implying a private right of action under section 6 would require fashioning a new body of federal broker-customer law to replace
traditional state regulation.' 9 Observing that a decision to imply a
private right of action under section 6 would require the conclusion that
Congress intended to impose upon brokers legal standards different
from those long recognized in state law, 8 the Colonial Realty court
noted that implication would saddle the federal courts with ordinary
customer-broker suits even between litigants of the same state. 8 ' A
leading commentator on securities regulation similarly expressed concern that litigation of broker-customer suits in federal courts under the
'34 Act would result in a substantial encroachment upon matters traditionally within state court jurisdiction.'82 Consequently, analysis of the
173

See Frankel, supra note 52, at 559-70.

" See
,, See
,,8
See
...
See

444 U.S. at 24.
422 U.S. at 78; text accompanying note 68 supra.
text accompanying notes 177-83 infra.
358 F.2d at 183; The Suitability Rule, supra note 17, at 503. Stock exchanges in
the United States originated as informal associations of persons buying and selling public
and private obligations. See Loss, supra note 1, at 996. The NYSE originated in a 1792
agreement between New York brokers trading in the $80 million bond issue with which the
federal government consolidated the Revolutionary War debt. See Brookman, The New
York Stock Exchange, in THE STOCK MARKET HANDBOOK 72 (1970). Between 1792 and 1939,
the NYSE operated as a wholly private organization. See 1 SEC, IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD
WHITNEY

177 (1938);

ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS, OPERATIONS AND ISSUES

107 (1966).

Recognizing that the private status of securities exchanges is inconsistent with their importance in the national economy, Congress enacted the '34 Act in an attempt to improve
previously inadequate exchange self-regulation. See SEN. REP. No. 792, supra note 56, at 4-5.
While the '34 Act represents the first exercise of public authority over the operation of exchanges per se, state law traditionally has governed the legal parameters of broker-client
relationships. See Loss, supra note 1, at 996-99; note 182 infra.
178 See 422 U.S. 66 (1975); 358 F.2d 178 (1966).
, See 358 F.2d at 183; text accompanying notes 180-81 infra.
' See 358 F.2d at 183.
,81
See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) ('34 Act, § 27); note 46 supra.
182 See Loss, supra note 1, at 996-99, 2005-06. In his treatise on the regulation of the
securities industry, Professor Loss indicated that if § 27 of the '34 Act were read so as to
embrace exchange rules, allegations of violations of exchange rules would suffice to
eliminate state court jurisdiction over matters traditionally within state court jurisdiction.
See id.
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fourth Cort factor provides no support for the implication of a private
right of action under section 6.183
Application of the four-part Cort analysis to the question whether an
implied cause of action exists under section 6 of the '34 Act indicates
plainly that the Colonial Realty and Buttrey decisions should no longer
dominate the development of the law in this area.1 8 4 While ColonialRealty
and Buttrey continue to influence lower court decisions with respect to
private rights of action under section 6,8' their precedential weight has
been severely diminished by the articulation of new standards for implying private rights of action under federal statutes.18 Under those new
standards, ColonialRealty and Buttrey are important primarily for their
analytic, not authoritative value. 8 '
Of the four factors to be considered in deciding whether to imply a
private right of action under a federal statute,'8 8 only two lend qualified
support to the implication of a private right under section 6. 89' Although
section 6 does not prohibit certain conduct or create federal rights in
favor of any particular group of persons, "' Congress enacted section 6 to
achieve the ultimate goal of protecting investors.' 1 Thus, in terms of
broad statutory policy, Congress appears to have enacted section 6 for
the especial benefit of a particular class of persons.'' Similarly, implying
a private right of action under section 6 for violations of exchange rules
would be consistent with section 6's purpose of mandating honesty and
fairness in exchange transactions.' 9' While the threat of potential liability
might discourage exchanges from promulgating new rules, the threat
See text accompanying notes 175-82 supra.
See text accompanying notes 109-83 supra.
"l See note 25 supra.
18 See text accompanying notes 61-97 supra.
's, See text accompanying notes 23-50 supra. The Colonial Realty approach, which conditions the availability of an implied right upon the extent to which an exchange rule is a
substitute for direct SEC regulation, fails to take into consideration the principles of Cort
and its progeny. See text accompanying notes 61-97 supra. Such an approach, however, is
relevant insofar as a court must inquire into the nature of a specific exchange rule after having concluded that § 6 does support an implied right of action. See 358 F.2d at 182. The Buttrey approach, which conditions the availability of an implied right upon the extent to which
the defendant's conduct approaches fraud, has proper application only in determining the
extent to which the implication of a private right of action under § 6 conflicts with the express liability provisions of the '34 Act or intrudes upon an area of the law traditionally
relegated to state court jurisdiction. See 410 F. Supp. at 143; text accompanying notes 37-50
183
18

supra.
See 422 U.S. at 78; text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
See text accompanying notes 109-134, 154-68 supra.
'8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); text accompanying notes 122-34 supra.
Il See text accompanying notes 109-120 supra.
8 See note 65 supra.
181 See text accompanying notes 156-61 supra.
" See Utah State Univ. of Agriculture and Applied Science v. Bear, Stearnes & Co.,
549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1977); text accompanying notes 162-70 supra.
188

'
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of liability would surely encourage diligent enforcement of and compliance with rules already in effect.'95
In addressing the four-factor Cort analysis, however, the Supreme
Court has leveled its most serious criticisms at precisely those Cort factors under which section 6 appears to qualify. "6 Even assuming that all
four factors remain relevant to the question of implication," 7 considering
the Supreme Court's new emphasis on the language and focus of federal
statutes,"8 great doubt exists whether a court could properly rely on the
protected class and statutory purpose factors to imply a private right of
action under section 6.1"' Moreover, if the question whether a court may
imply a private right of action under a federal statute is to be resolved
solely by reference to indications of congressional intent to create civil
liability,"' section 6 even more clearly does not support the implication
of a private right of action.201 Because the language and legislative
history of the '34 Act are bereft of any indication that Congress intended
to enforce stock exchange rules through the imposition of civil liability,"2
there is no statutory basis from which to imply a private right of action
under section 6."' Without such a basis, the Supreme Court has held that
a court may not properly imply a private right of action from a federal
statute."4
Colonial Realty and Buttrey, like many decisions involving implied
private rights of action under the Federal securities laws, have been
overshadowed by the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the law5
relating to implied private rights of action under federal statutes.1
While commentators have severely criticized the Supreme Court's more
restrictive approach toward implying private rights of action under
federal statutes,"' in the case of section 6, a more restricted approach is

See
See
" See
99 supra.
19 See
9 See
"' See
"9
"9

text accompanying notes 154-59 supra.
text accompanying note 90 supra.
U.S.
California v. Sierra Club, __

101 S. Ct. 1775, 1778; note

text accompanying notes 75-97 supra.
id.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Transamerica Mort-

gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); text accompanying notes 75-97 supra.
'9' See text accompanying notes 135-53 supra.
See text accompanying notes 135-43 supra.
See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679-81 (9th Cir. 1980); Coleman v.
D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,252, 91,647
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); text accompanying notes 128-34, 144-53 supra.
' See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-79 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-25 (1979); text accompanying notes 75-97 supra.
"9 See generally Frankel, supra note 5; text accompanying notes 61-97 supra.
9 See Ratner, The Demise of the Implied Private Right of Action in the Supreme
Court, 11 INST. SEc. REG. 289-301 (1980); Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger
Court Takes the Federal Courts out of the Business of Protecting FederalRights, 30
RUTGERS L. REv. 841-62 (1977). Frankel, supra note 52, at 584-85.
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consistent with the role of exchange rules in the securities laws.20 7 As
Congress deemed it wise not to undertake direct regulation of stock exchange transactions and broker-client relationships," 8 courts should be
hesitant to undertake direct regulation themselves."' Within the
parameters of section 6 of the '34 Act,"'0 exchanges should be free to
establish standards of member conduct without fear of creating enormous and unexpected liabilities.'
JOHN

See
See
See
210See
21, See

M. BLOXOM,IV

Jennings, supra note 6, at 667-74; text accompanying notes 121-27 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); note 7 supra.
text accompanying notes 135-53 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); note 7 supra.
text accompanying notes 161-68 supra.

